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In two experiments we investigated whether older adult controls (OACs) and people with 
mild and moderate Alzheimer’s disease (AD) benefit from false memory priming effects in 
subsequent problem-solving tasks. In addition, and unlike in previous false memory priming 
studies with older adults, we examined latency measures in the recognition phase. In 
Experiment 1 participants were asked to solve compound remote associate task (CRAT) 
problems, half of which had been preceded by the presentation of Deese/Roediger-
McDermott (DRM) lists whose critical lures (CLs) were also the solutions to those problems. 
In Experiment 2, we used a similar paradigm but investigated whether CLs could prime 
solutions to subsequent analogical reasoning problems. In this latter experiment, we also 
examined whether these priming effects were stronger when the activation of the CL term 
occurred during the memory task (was presented as part of the list; i.e., true memories) or 
when these items were not presented but arose during encoding due to spreading activation 
(i.e., false memories). We found that all three groups’ performance on these tasks was 
facilitated only by false memories spontaneously generated from the prior presentation of 
DRM lists. That is, performance on CRATs and analogical reasoning tasks was better 
(greater accuracy and faster speed) when those problems were preceded by DRM lists whose 
CLs also served as the solution to those problems. These findings are consistent with 
previous results from studies with children, young adults, and older adults and extends them 
to people with more moderate AD. 
 
Keywords: Alzheimer’s disease, analogical reasoning, compound remote associates, DRM 
paradigm, false memory priming. 
  




Alzheimer’s disease (AD) is a progressive neurodegenerative condition which is 
characterized by a reduction in learning and memory performance as well as rapid forgetting 
of new information. Long-term memory is the most profoundly affected cognitive domain in 
AD. In particular, research suggests (e.g., Moulin, Perfect, & Jones 2000) that an encoding 
deficit, rather than increased forgetting, underlies the poor performance on episodic memory 
tasks for people with AD. 
It has been suggested that one reason for episodic memory deficits in aging generally 
(e.g., Dew & Giovanello, 2010; Naveh-Benjamin, Shing, Kilb, Werkle-Bergner, & 
Lindenberger, 2009), and Alzheimer’s disease more specifically (e.g., Fleishman et al., 2005; 
Meiran & Jelicic, 1995), is an impairment in strategic recollection. That is, age differences 
will be maximized when memory tasks rely on consciously-controlled processes.  In other 
words, tasks that require explicit memory are at greater risk of exhibiting age- and AD-
related declines than tasks that require less-effortful, implicit memory. Whereas explicit 
memory tasks require participants to consciously recall or recognize recently processed 
information, implicit memory tasks do not.  Instead, implicit memory is indexed by finding 
that prior exposure to information can improve task performance even in the absence of 
participants’ explicit awareness or memory for the information they were exposed to earlier.   
One way of demonstrating this episodic deficit is with tests of recognition, where 
participants have to differentiate old items (what they have previously studied) from new 
items (what they did not study earlier). In this case, participants with AD tend to correctly 
recognize fewer old items than controls.  They also make more false positive errors 
(incorrectly judging a new item to be old) than healthy older control participants. This 
combined problem of relatively low hits and high false positives is interesting because it 
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suggests that as well as merely forgetting previously presented stimuli, AD patients also 
confuse new items as old. 
 The Deese Roediger-McDermott (DRM: Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) 
paradigm is commonly used to examine false memories. Participants are presented with a list 
of words all of which are associatively related (e.g., table, sit, legs) and are also associated 
with a critical lure (CL) word that is never presented (i.e., chair). When memory is 
subsequently tested using recall or recognition tasks, healthy participants show a tendency to 
falsely recall and recognize the CLs as having been presented on the list (e.g., Balota, 
Cortese, Duchek, Adams, Roediger, McDermott, & Yerys, 1999; McDermott, 1999).  
Spreading associative activation theories (e.g., Associative-activation theory, AAT, 
Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009; Activation-monitoring theory, AMT, Roediger, 
Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001) are the more dominate explanations of the increase in 
false positives for CLs. These theories suggest that false memories are produced because of 
two distinct processes: (1) an activation process where items in associative memory become 
active upon presentation and this activation then spreads to related, but non-presented, 
information in memory and (2) for adults at least, there is an additional source-monitoring 
process (see AMT in particular) that occurs during retrieval. Because the presentation of each 
of the list words during the DRM task automatically activates the related but unpresented CL, 
the CL is activated many times through an automatic spread of activation within the 
associative network. It is this activation that increases the feeling of familiarity for the item, 
while at the same time reducing the ability to remember the source of its activation (source-
monitoring process). This monitoring process involves a two-step model of recognition (e.g., 
Atkinson & Juola, 1974), where there are separate criteria for old and new responses. If an 
item’s familiarity falls above the higher criterion, subjects can make a rapid old response. If 
familiarity falls below the lower criterion, subjects will make a rapid new response. Items 
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whose familiarity falls somewhere in between the two criteria undergo an additional checking 
process, yielding longer latencies. The heightened familiarity of the CL should lead 
participants toward endorsing the CL as old, but to do this, they will likely engage the slower 
checking process. This is because although the CL appears familiar with multiple activations, 
it was never actually presented. Thus, responses to CLs should be slower than responses to 
unrelated or weakly related items, items that should be less likely to engage the additional 
checking process.  
The majority of studies using the DRM paradigm have reported accuracy not speed 
data, with latencies having only rarely been reported. One of these exceptions appears in a 
study by Jou, Matus, Aldridge, Rogers, and Zimmerman (2004, Experiment 1) who showed 
reaction times for false alarms were reliably longer than reaction times for hits. However, 
Tun, Wingfield, Rosen, and Blanchard, (1998) reported no difference between hits and false 
alarm RTs. Coane, McBride, Raulerson, and Jordan (2007) in two experiments using short-
term memory tasks reported longer RTs for false alarms compared to hits. Interestingly, in 
their study they reported slower RTs for correct rejections compared to weakly related items. 
 Importantly, false memories generated in the DRM paradigm do not simply represent 
false positive errors on a memory test but can also be considered a kind of self-generated 
memory response – that is, it is information generated from the activation of one’s own 
internal semantic network. As such, this self-generated information can be more powerful and 
more memorable than information that was actually presented (other-generated information 
or “true” memories). Indeed, it is well known that self-generated information is less 
susceptible to the effects of forgetting, being better retained over long retention intervals 
(e.g., see Mulligan & Lozito, 2004; Sui & Humphreys, 2015).  
 This interpretation concerning the importance of self-generation effects in memory 
(and its extension to false memories) has gained considerable currency in the child 
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development literature (e.g., Cunningham, Brebner, Quinn, & Turk, 2014; Ford & Lobao, 
2018), the literature on memory in young adults (e.g., Mulligan & Lozito, 2004) as well as 
old adults (for a review, see Gutchess & Kensinger, 2018), and quite possibly could extend to 
older adults with AD (at least in the early stages) (Klein, Cosmides, & Costabile, 2003; Rosa, 
Deason, Budson, & Gutchess, 2015). Because the self can be the very “glue” that binds 
encoded elements together to create strong and durable traces, these traces are particularly 
well remembered (e.g., Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Sui & Humphreys, 2015). 
 Moreover, it turns out that self-generated information serves as better primes in 
subsequent problem-solving tasks then other-generated information, especially following a 
delay (see Howe, Wilkinson, & Monaghan, 2012). For example, Howe, Threadgold, 
Norbury, Garner, and Ball (2013) presented children and adults with DRM lists that either 
contained the CLs as presented items (true memory) or used the standard DRM procedure 
where the CLs were not contained in the list (false memory). The CL was also the solution to 
a subsequent series of analogical reasoning problems. Verbal proportional analogies refer to 
problems of the sort, a is to b as c is to (d)? where the participant’s job is to come up with the 
d term. As a specific example, participants might be presented with a problem such as 
“Wardrobe is to Clothes as Bed is to ?” In this case, the question is whether the solution word 
“sleep” can be primed by the DRM list whose CL is “sleep.”  
A further question was whether the CL, regardless of whether it was actually 
presented or self-generated, could serve to prime the answers to these reasoning problems. 
The results showed that only the self-generated (false memory) CLs from DRM lists served 
as effective primes for these reasoning problems. That is, both children and adults were more 
likely to solve these reasoning problems, and solved them more quickly, when the CL had 
been self-generated and that the actually presented CLs had no beneficial effect on problem-
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solving. Indeed, for both age groups, there was no significant difference between solution 
times for unprimed analogical problems and those primed by true memories. 
 Recently, we (Akhtar & Howe, 2019) replicated this same finding with healthy older 
adults and those with mild AD. Although as expected, healthy older adults were better (both 
in terms of speed and accuracy) at solving problems than people with mild AD and both 
groups performed better when false memories served as primes than when true memories 
served as primes or when there were no primes. Like the data from both children and adults, 
there were no reliable differences between unprimed and true primed problems for either the 
healthy older adults or those with mild AD. 
 False memories not only serve as effective primes for analogical reasoning problems 
but also for compound remote associates tests (CRATs). CRATs are problems involving the 
presentation of three unrelated words (e.g., walk, beauty, over) and the participant has to 
come up with a fourth word (in this case the CL, sleep) that when combined with each of the 
presented words, creates a new compound word or phrase (e.g., sleep walk, beauty sleep, 
sleep over). Howe, Wilkinson, Garner, and Ball (2016) examined these problems with 
children (also see Howe, Garner, Charlesworth, & Knott, 2011) and adults. Like the findings 
for analogical reasoning problems, they found that DRM lists whose CLs were the solution to 
a series of subsequently presented CRATs were solved more often and more rapidly when the 
solution CL had been falsely generated. Similarly, Akhtar, Howe, and Hoepstine (in press) 
found that healthy older adults and those with mild AD solved CRATs more frequently and 
more rapidly when DRM lists whose CL had been falsely recognized prior to the presentation 
of the CRATs than when they had not been falsely recognized or when they had not been 
preceded by a relevant DRM list. 
 In the current research, we wanted to (1) replicate our previous findings on false 
memory priming effects in healthy older adults and those with mild AD, (2) extend these 
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findings to participants with more moderate AD, and (3) explore whether latencies in the 
recognition phase can differentiate responses to actually presented list items, false memory 
items generated by associative activation during encoding (related but unpresented items), 
and foil items that were never presented and were unrelated to list items. We did this because, 
first, we wanted to see the extent to which self-generated information facilitates problem-
solving performance in people with moderate AD not just mild AD. Second, there exists a 
large clinical literature showing that there are a number of important semantic deficits 
associated with AD, particularly of the moderate than mild variety (e.g., Hodges, Salmon, & 
Butters, 1992; Howard & Patterson, 1992). However, despite these deficits, we have found 
that priming effects exist at least in older people with mild AD (Akhtar & Howe, 2019; 
Akhtar et al., in press) and Nebes (1989) as well as Evard, Colombel, Gilet, and Corson 
(2016) have shown that semantic priming effects in AD remains relatively intact. What we 
are addressing in the following two experiments, is whether priming effects are still present 
in more severe cases of AD. That is, our current experiments are designed to examine 
whether semantic associative processes are still engaged automatically in participants with 
moderate AD and whether the results of these processes can be used to facilitate subsequent 
problem solving. 
 We made the following predictions. First, although healthy older adults and adults 
with mild AD can make appropriate responses on recognition tests (e.g., consciously 
discriminate between actually presented items and unrelated foils), we anticipate that those 
adults with moderate AD will not be able to make these conscious recognition responses, 
instead claiming that all recognition items are “new” (Akhtar, Moulin, & Bowie 2005; 
Moulin 2002; Moulin et al., 2000). Second, despite their inability to make appropriate verbal 
responses on the recognition test, we anticipated that the time it takes adults with moderate 
AD to make a response will follow the same trajectory as that for healthy older adults and 
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those with mild AD. That is, as discussed earlier, when reaction times have been reported for 
participants in the DRM task, the lag for responding to CLs tends to be the longest followed 
by quicker response times to items actually presented (e.g., Coane et al., 2007; Jou et al., 
2004). Thus, regardless of the participant’s actual verbal or conscious recognition response, 
we predict that the pattern of response times will be similar across all three groups of 
participants. Of course, there will be group differences in the absolute values of the response 
times, where people with moderate AD will take longer overall to respond than people with 
mild AD who in turn will take longer to respond than healthy older adults.  
Finally, if these patterns hold across groups, then it may be the case that participants 
in all groups will have formed false memories for the CL and these false memories should 
facilitate performance on subsequent problem-solving tasks (CRATs in Experiment 1 and 
analogies in Experiment 2). Thus, although people with moderate AD may not “know” they 
have formed a false memory for the CL, the response latencies may show that one has formed 
automatically in memory, indicating that some associative networks are still intact. If so, then 
there should be a performance advantage for those problems whose solutions have been 
primed by that CL.  Note that no part of these studies or analyses were pre-registered prior to 
the research being conducted.  We report how we determined our sample size, all data 
exclusions (if any), all inclusion/exclusion criteria, whether inclusion/exclusion criteria were 
established prior to data analysis, all manipulations, and all measures in the study.  The 
anonymized data and materials for both experiments have been publicly archived at the 
University of Hertfordshire Research Archive and can be accessed via 
https://doi.org/10.18745/ds.22095. 
Experiment 1 
 In our first experiment, we wanted to establish whether older adult control (OAC) 
participants, people with mild AD, and people with moderate AD could generate CLs from 
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DRM lists and subsequently use them to facilitate problem-solving. To do this, we examined 
people’s ability to remember DRM lists and self-generated CLs from those lists and their 
ability to use those false memories to aid their performance on subsequent CRAT problems.  
Method 
Participants. Using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), we ran an a priori 
power analysis where we estimated the effect as medium (d = 0.5) and power of 0.80. The 
power analysis showed that we needed a sample of 30 participants per group. A sample of 90 
participants was recruited whose demographic and other characteristics are shown in Table 1. 
This study was approved by the psychology ethics committee at City, University of London 
(ethics approval reference PSYETH (T/F) 16/17 209).  
Sixty participants had a clinical diagnosis of probable or possible AD (McKhann, 
Drachman, Folstein, Katzman, Price, & Stadlan, 1984). Of these 60 participants with AD, 30 
had mild AD and 30 had moderate AD. Participation took place in the participant’s home or 
at a local Day Centre to the participant. Thirty participants made up the OAC group. These 
people were community dwelling and were recruited from a panel of older adults who had 
expressed an interest in participating in research. Participation took place at City, University 
of London. There were no significant differences between OACs and AD participants in 
terms of age, years of education, or performance on the National Adult Reading Test, but as 
shown in Table 1, all three groups differed on most cognitive tests.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Design, Materials, and Procedure. A 3 (Group: Moderate AD vs. Mild AD vs. OAC) x 3 
(Priming: prime/FM vs. prime/noFM vs. unprimed) mixed design was used, where the first 
factor was between-participants and the second was a within-participant factor. We followed 
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the same procedure as Akhtar et al. (in press) and Howe et al. (2011, 2016) such that each 
participant was primed on half the subsequent CRAT problems with preceding DRM lists 
whose critical lures were also the solution to those CRAT problems. The order of both the 
DRM lists and CRAT problems was carefully counterbalanced to eliminate order effects.  
Ten CRAT problems were selected from the normative data collected previously by Akhtar et 
al. (in press) (see Appendix A). Their unprimed solution rates ranged between 30% and 80% 
in order to ensure that they were neither too easy nor too hard. In addition, 10 DRM lists 
whose CLs were the corresponding solutions to these CRATs were selected. Each list 
contained 10 word associates of the critical lure and were taken from the Roediger, Watson, 
McDermott, and Gallo (2001) norms. Associative words that overlapped with the items in the 
CRAT problems were removed and replaced with another associate. Lists were randomly 
divided into two groups of five with participants being primed using one of these sets. In 
order to prevent differences in false memory rates, the two sets of five DRM lists were 
equated on backward associative strength (BAS) (List Set 1 BAS = 0.777, List Set 2 BAS = 
0.725). 
 Participants were given one set of the five DRM lists in a randomized order. 
Each list was presented verbally, followed by a distractor task (counting backwards in 3s). 
This was followed by a recognition test whereby participants were verbally presented, in 
random order, the 5 critical lure words from the studied DRM lists, 5 unstudied and unrelated 
critical lures, 32 true items from the studied DRM lists, and 32 foils unrelated to studied 
DRM lists. A recognition test was implemented rather than a recall test to reduce effects of 
priming during retrieval (Olszewska & Ulatowska, 2013). For each word presented in the 
recognition task, participants had to select on the keyboard either [O], indicating that the 
word was Old and that they recognize the word from the previously presented lists, or [N] if 
they thought the current word presented was a new word that they did not hear in the 
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previous word lists. Following completion of the DRM lists, participants had to solve CRAT 
problems. Participants were told that they would see three words and that they should try and 
produce a fourth word that, when combined with each of the three items, would make up a 
common compound word or phrase. Participants were first given three demonstrations by the 
experimenter followed by two practice problems prior to the experimental CRATs. The three 
problem words were presented on a computer screen simultaneously in a horizontal 
orientation, with one word above, below, and at the center fixation point. Participants were 
given 30s to produce the solution (this was a verbal solution and participants first response 
was recorded). If the solution was produced within the time limit, both the solution word and 
solution time were recorded, and the next problem was presented. If participants did not 
produce the correct response within the time limit, the solution was provided by the 
experimenter and the program automatically moved to the next problem. All 10 CRAT 
problems were completed, and solution rates and solution times were collected for correctly 
solved CRAT problems.  
Results and Discussion 
Recognition Task 
 We were interested in two factors in the recognition task. First, we were interested in 
recognition rates and, more specifically, whether all three groups produced false memories. 
In addition, we wanted to compare recognition rates across the different item types. Second, 
we were interested in latency measures for correctly recognized items across different item 
types. 
 Recognition Rates. As predicted the moderate AD group responded ‘N’ (new) to all 
items, indicating they were not able to consciously discriminate between the different item 
types. Because of this, we removed them from this set of analyses. The mean correct 
recognition rate (percentage) and the mean recognition reaction time (milliseconds) were 
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calculated for each participant and analyzed separately in a series of 2(Group: Mild AD vs. 
OAC) x 4(Item Type: Critical lures vs. Unrelated Critical Lures vs. List Items vs. Foils) 
analyses of variance (ANOVAs).  The recognition task (see Table 2) showed that both the 
OACs and the Mild AD group created false memories for the critical lure words, with the 
mild AD group falsely recognizing the critical lure 64.93% (M = 3.3, SD = 1.31) of the time 
and the OAC group 63.01% (M = 3.2, SD = .91) of the time. There was no reliable 
difference.  
The 2 x 4 ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of item type, F (3, 58) = 
1175.24, p < .001, η²p = .953. Pairwise comparisons revealed greater recognition for list items 
(79%) compared to correct rejection of foil items (61%) (M = 23.40, SD = 3.54 vs. M = 
19.53, SD = 4.78, respectively) and greater false recognition of CL words (64%) compared to 
unrelated CL words (40.4%) (M = 3.03, SD = .80 vs. M = 2.02, SD = 1.08, respectively). 
There was also a main effect for group F (1, 58) = 63.7, p < .001, η²p = .53. To investigate 
this further, we conducted separate t-tests for item types. For actual list items, the OAC group 
correctly recognized significantly more items (M = 27.28, SD = 3.16) than people with Mild 
AD (M = 23.1, SD = 3.15), t (59) = 3.5, p < .001. Concerning foil items, again the OAC 
group correctly rejected significantly more items (M = 22.43, SD = 4.54) than people with 
mild AD (M = 16.63, SD = 2.94), t (59) = 2.28, p < .05. There was no interaction (F < 1). 
    
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Signal Detection Analysis. The values of d’ and C are shown in Table 3. Again, the 
moderate AD group were excluded from this analysis as they responded ‘N’ to all items in 
the recognition task. Signal detection measures for hits and critical lures were analyzed in 
separate 2 (Group: Mild AD vs. OAC) X 2 (Item Type: critical lures vs. studied items) 
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mixed-model ANOVAs. The analysis of d’ revealed a main effect of item type, where 
discriminability was better for critical lures compared to list items, F (1, 58) = 68.72, p < 
.001, η²p = .23. There was no main effect of group and no interaction (ps ns).  
Analysis of the criterion C revealed a more liberal bias for the critical lures F (1, 58) = 
10.15, p < .001, η²p = .48 compared to studied items. There was also a main effect of group F 
(1, 58) = 23.59, p < .001, η²p = .41 where people with Mild AD revealed a more liberal bias 
compared to OACs. There was no significant interaction. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Recognition Times. Despite the moderate AD group not being able to consciously 
discriminate between the item types, we analyzed their latencies during the recognition phase 
for the different item types. We conducted these analyses in order to create a proxy measure 
of recognition memory for these participants.  That is, although people with moderate AD 
may not be able to provide explicit recognition responses, perhaps any differences in their 
latencies to say “new” to the various items on the test list reflects their implicit recognition 
response. For example, perhaps longer latencies to say “new” to “old” items reflect the fact 
that there is a residual trace for that item in memory, one that inhibits or delays the incorrect 
overt “new” response.  If so, then perhaps shorter latencies reflect the absence of such a trace 
for truly “new” items.  Finally, if false memory probes exhibit a response delay similar to that 
seen for items that had actually been presented, then this may indicate that traces also exist in 
memory for critical lures.  What this would show is that even for people with moderate AD, 
spreading activation mechanisms remain intact for semantic associations in long-term 
memory.   
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To do this we first looked at the pattern of correctly recognized item RTs across the 
different item types for the OACs and the mild AD group and then compared their patterns to 
the moderate AD group. Data points with RTs that fell above or below 2 SDs for each 
participant were omitted from the analysis.  The mean recognition reaction times 
(milliseconds) were calculated for each participant and analyzed in a 2 (Group: OAC vs Mild 
AD) vs 4 (Item type: CLs, List Items, Unrelated unpresented CLs and foils) mixed-model 
ANOVA (see Table 4).  There was a main effect of item type [F (3, 57) = 194.2 p < .001, η²p 
= .77]. Tukey’s post-hoc tests indicated longer RTs for CLs (6373 ms, p < .05), followed by 
list items (5298 ms, p < .05), foils (3737 ms), and unrelated CLs (3876 ms) (there were no 
reliable difference between the latter two). As expected there was a main effect of group F (1, 
58) = 427.9, p < .001, η²p = .88, Tukey’s post-hoc tests showed the mild AD group were 
reliably slower (5428.2 ms) compared to the OACs (4214.6 ms). There was no interaction (p 
> .05). We ran separate analyses comparing false recognition of CLs versus correct rejections 
of CLs [ F (1, 58) = 347.59 p < .001, η²p = .77] and found that false recognition of critical 
lures was reliably slower (6373 ms) than correct rejections of these same lures (5149 ms). We 
also compared correct recognition of list items to those list items that were not correctly 
recognized F (1, 58) = 369.78, p < .001, η²p = .86, and found that correctly recognized list 
items were reliably slower (5298 ms) than those list items that were not correct recognized 
(3938 ms). There was no difference in reaction times for correctly rejected foils compared to 
foils not rejected (p > .05) and no difference in reaction time between correctly rejected 
unrelated CLs and those that were not rejected. 
Next, we examined whether this pattern of latencies was also evident in the moderate 
AD group. If so, then based on their item type latencies, we could work out how many 
probable CLs, correct rejections, and list items moderate AD people implicitly recognized 
(see Table 2). Because there were no differences in RT for correctly rejected foils/unrelated 
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CLs versus nonrejected foils/unrelated CLs for the Mild AD group and the OACs, we only 
included the reaction times for foils and unrelated CLs for the moderate group in the main 
analysis. Again, data points with RTs that fell above or below 2 SDs for each participant in 
the moderate AD group were omitted from the analysis.  
Overall reaction time was analyzed using a 3 (Group: Mod AD vs Mild AD vs OAC) 
x 4 (item type: critical lure, unstudied unrelated critical lures, foils, and list items) mixed-
model ANOVA was computed on correctly recognized items (and probable recognized items 
for the Moderate AD group). There was a significant main effect of item type, F (3, 87) = 
338.54, p < .001, η²p = .79. Tukey’s post-hoc tests showed greater RTs for CLs (7024 ms) 
compared to list items (5831 ms), foils (4030 ms), and unrelated CLs (4129 ms). 
Furthermore, RTs for list items were reliably slower than for foils and unrelated CLs. There 
were no reliable differences in RT for foils and unrelated CLs.  As expected there was also a 
main effect of group, F (2, 87) = 185, p < .001, η²p = .81. Tukey’s post-hoc tests revealed that 
the moderate AD group took reliably longer on the recognition task (6119 ms) compared to 
the mild AD group (5428.17 ms) and OACs (4214 ms) with the latter two also differing 
reliably. There was no significant interaction (p ns). 
Overall, these data show that in line with the monitoring-process model, all groups 
spent longer on the critical lure words than the other item types. Importantly, and hitherto 
unreported, this pattern held for the moderate AD group (see Table 4). This latter finding is 
critical because it may indicate that although adults with moderate AD responded “new” to 
all items, there may have been some residual memory activation for presented items and CLs 
that caused the delay in rejecting these items as “new,” with false memories having higher 
residual activation rates than list items (as predicted by associative-activation models). We 
now turn to whether these probable false memories that were implicitly activated can 
facilitate subsequent problem-solving. 




INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
CRAT Task  
 The mean CRAT solution rates (proportions) and the mean CRAT solution 
times (in seconds) were calculated for each participant and analyzed separately in a series of 
3 (Group: Moderate AD vs. Mild AD vs. OAC) x 3 (Priming: primed/FM vs. primed/no-FM 
vs. unprimed) ANOVAs. For primed CRAT problems, solution rates and solution times were 
conditionalized on whether participants had produced the critical lure during recognition 
(OACs and mild AD) or by using reaction times for “new” recognition responses as a proxy 
for the moderate AD group creating three categories of priming (i.e., primed/FM = relevant 
DRM list was presented and the critical lure was falsely recognized and primed/no-FM = 
relevant DRM list was presented but the critical lure was not falsely recognized; note that 
priming effects are only found when CLs have been falsely recognized). The average 
percentage of primed items where the critical lure was falsely recognized (primed/FM) and 
was not recognized (primed/no-FM) are shown in Table 5. Thus, both solution rates and 
solution times were subjected to separate ANOVAs where the factors were solution type 
(unprimed, primed/no-FM, or primed/FM) and group. The data are shown in Table 6. 
 CRAT Solution Times. Concerning solution times, there was a main effect for 
priming F(2, 87) = 83.89, p < .001, η²p = .5, where Tukey’s post-hoc tests showed that 
solution times were faster for primed/FM problems (M = 27.59 s ) compared to primed/No-
FM problems (M = 37.5 s, p < .01), and unprimed CRAT problems (M = 37.16 s, p = < .01), 
and the latter two conditions did not differ. There was also a main effect of group, F(2, 87) = 
134.08, p < .001, η²p = .76. Tukey’s post-hoc tests showed that the OACs were reliably faster 
at solving CRAT problems (M = 27.17 s) compared to Mild (M = 33.52 s) and Moderate (M 
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= 41.57 s) AD groups, with the latter two also differing reliably. There was no interaction (p 
ns). 
 CRAT Solution Rates. Concerning solution rates, there was a main effect for 
priming F(2, 87) = 50.13, p < .001, η²p = .374, where Tukey’s post-hoc tests showed that 
solution rates were higher for primed/FM CRAT problems (M = 2.75) than for primed/no-
FM (M = 1.63) and when participants were unprimed (M = 1.60), and the latter two did not 
differ. There was also a main effect for group, F(2, 87) = 29.03, p < .001, η²p = .409. Tukey’s 
post-hoc tests revealed that the OACs solved reliably more CRATS (M = 2.62) compared to 
the Mild (M = 2.00) and Moderate (M = 1.38) AD groups, with the latter two groups also 
differing significantly. There was no interaction (p ns). 
 
INSERT TABLES 5 AND 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
 What these findings tell us is that even though people with moderate AD do not 
consciously discriminate old from new items on recognition tests, saying “new” to 
everything, the time they take to say “new” differs as a function of item type. That is, just like 
OACs and people with mild AD, those with moderate AD take longer to respond to CL 
probes than items that were presented. Moreover, the CLs that were automatically activated 
in memory during encoding served as effective primes for all groups when it came to solve 
subsequently presented CRAT problems. Thus, it would seem that even for those people 
whose AD has progressed to a moderate level, associative networks may still be intact, and 
the information contained within them can be used to prime problem solutions. 
 
Experiment 2 
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 Having established the existence of false memory priming effects even in people with 
moderate AD (at least using CRAT problems), we wanted to extend these findings to more 
difficult problems (verbal proportional analogies) as well as examine whether primes are as 
effective when they are actually presented in DRM lists (true memories) as when they are 
self-generated (false memories). Thus, in our second experiment, we examined the propensity 
of healthy older adults, people with mild AD, and people with moderate AD to remember 
DRM lists and (automatically) self-generate CLs from those lists as well as their ability to use 
those false memories to aid their performance on subsequent analogical problem-solving 
tasks. 
Method 
A new sample of 90 participants was recruited whose demographic and other characteristics 
are shown in Table 1. Like Experiment 1, this study was also approved by the ethics 
committee at City, University of London (ethics approval reference PSYETH (T/F) 16/17 
209).  
Sixty participants had a clinical diagnosis of probable or possible AD (McKhann et 
al., 1984). Of these 60 participants with AD, 30 had mild AD and 30 had moderate AD. 
Participation took place in the participant’s home or at a local Day Centre attended by the 
participant. The remaining 30 participants made up the OAC group. These people were 
community dwelling and were recruited from a panel of older adults who had expressed an 
interest in participating in research. Participation took place at City, University of London. 
There were no significant differences between OAC’s and AD participants on age, years of 
education, and scores on the National Adult Reading Test, but as shown in Table 1, all three 
groups differed on most cognitive tests.  
Design. A 3(Group: Moderate AD vs. Mild AD vs. OAC) x 5(Priming: true memory prime 
vs. true memory no priming vs. false memory prime vs. false memory no priming vs. 
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unprimed) mixed design was used. Group was a between-participants factor and priming was 
a within-participant factor. Primed problems were analyzed for those participants who either 
correctly remembered the critical lure when it was actually presented in the word list (true 
memory priming) or falsely remembered the critical lure when it was not presented in the 
word list (false memory priming). Finally, there were unprimed problems where no word list 
relevant to the problem had been presented. 
Materials and Procedure. The procedure was essentially a replication of Akhtar and Howe 
(2019). All of the DRM lists and analogies used were previously normed (Akhtar & Howe, 
2019) and are shown in Appendix B. The procedure had three stages: study phase, 
recognition task, and problem-solving task. There were nine DRM lists selected from 
Roediger et al. (2001). Each DRM list consisted of 12 words (e.g., table, legs, seat, couch) 
and was associated with an unpresented CL item (i.e., chair).  Associative words that 
overlapped with the items in the analogical problems were removed and replaced with 
another associate. 
 Study phase. Participants were tested individually and were presented verbally with 
six of the nine DRM lists in a randomized order. Three of the lists contained the true memory 
prime (i.e., the first presented item in the list was the critical lure and analogy solution) and 
three of the lists did not contain the critical lure to three of the subsequently presented 
analogies (i.e., the critical lure/analogy solution would be the associated but unpresented 
critical lure to each of the three lists). Each list was presented verbally by the experimenter 
and was followed by a brief distractor task (counting backwards in threes). Following this, 
the next list was presented. This pattern of study then distractor task continued until all six 
lists were presented. 
Recognition task. Following a five-minute distractor task, participants took part in a 
recognition task. Participants were verbally presented, in random order, with the 6 critical 
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lure words (3 true and 3 false words) from the studied DRM lists, 6 unstudied and unrelated 
critical lure words (these were critical lures taken from unrelated and non-presented DRM 
lists), 32 list items (these were studied words from the presented DRM lists), and 32 
unrelated words (these were words taken from unrelated and non-presented DRM lists; 
unrelated foils). All items in the recognition test were taken from Roediger et al. (2001). 
Again, we used a recognition test rather than a recall test to reduce effects of priming during 
retrieval (Olszewska & Ulatowska, 2013). For each word presented in the recognition task, 
participants had to select either [O], indicating that the word was Old and that they recognize 
the word from the previously presented lists, or [N] if they thought the current word 
presented was a new word that they did not hear in the previous word lists.  
Analogical reasoning task. The final task was to solve verbal analogical-reasoning 
problems. Participants solved a practice problem before completing nine test analogical-
reasoning problems. In a randomized order, participants were presented with nine analogical-
reasoning problems in the format of ‘a is to b as c is to ?’ For example, the analogy for the 
critical lure ‘foot’ was ‘hat is to head as sock is to _____.’ Participants provided their 
answers verbally to the experimenter (participants first response was recorded). The time 
taken for them to complete the analogical problem, from presentation of the analogical 
problem to production of the response, was recorded. Participants were given a maximum of 
60 s to provide an answer. Presentation of the DRM lists according to their link to the 
solution type in the unprimed, true memory prime, and false memory prime conditions was 
fully counterbalanced such that each DRM list and associated analogical-reasoning problem 
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Results and Discussion 
Recognition Task 
 Like in Experiment 1, we were interested in people’s recognition rates and reaction 
times. Again, during the recognition task the moderate AD group responded ‘N’ (new) to all 
items (without exception) showing that they were not able to discriminate between the 
different item types. As such, the data from this group were removed from the recognition 
task analysis. The mean correct recognition rate (percentage) and the mean recognition 
reaction time (milliseconds) were calculated for each participant and analyzed separately in a 
series of 2(Group: Mild AD vs. OAC) x 4 (Item Type: Critical lures vs. Unrelated Critical 
Lures vs. List Items vs. Foils). 
Recognition Rates. The recognition task showed that both the OACs and the Mild AD group 
created false memories for the critical lure words, with the Mild AD group falsely 
recognizing the critical lure 61.93% (M = 1.88, SD = 0.45) of the time and the OAC group 
60% (M = 1.25, SD = .81) of the time (see Table 7). There were no reliable group differences 
(t ns).  
When an ANOVA was conducted, there was a significant main effect of item type, 
F(3, 57) = 857.31, p < .001, η²p = .93. Pairwise comparisons revealed greater recognition for 
list items (77.22%) compared to foil items [correctly identifying these as ‘New’ items, 
(60.8%) (M = 24.71, SD = 3.16 vs M = 19.47, SD = 5.86)] and greater recognition of CL 
words (60%) compared to unrelated CL words (48.32%) (M = 4.2, SD = 1.18 vs. M = 2.57, 
SD = 1.22). There was also a main effect of group F(1, 58) = 42.44, p < .001. To investigate 
this further, we conducted separate t-tests on item types; for list items, the OAC group 
recognized significantly more items (M = 26.32, SD = 3.16) than people with mild AD (M = 
23.1, SD = 3.15) t (59) = 3.5, p < .001. Concerning foil items, again the OAC group correctly 
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rejected significantly more items (M = 22.62, SD = 6.2) than people with mild AD (M = 
16.31, SD = 3.3), t (59) = 2.28, p < .05.  
 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
Signal Detection Analysis. We again ran signal detection analysis. The values of d’ and C 
are shown in Table 8. Signal detection measures for hits and critical lures were analyzed in 
separate 2 (Group: Mild AD vs OAC) x 2 (Item Type: critical lures vs studied items) mixed-
model ANOVA. The analysis of d’ revealed a main effect of item type, where 
discriminability was better for critical lures compared to list items, F(1, 58) = 46.67, p < .001, 
η²p = .17. There was no main effect of group and no interaction (ps ns). Analysis of the 
criterion C revealed a more liberal bias for the critical lures F(1, 58) = 7.2, p < .001, η²p = .35 
compared to studied items. There was also a main effect of group F(1, 58) = 18.29, p < .001, 
η²p = .41, where people with Mild AD revealed a more liberal bias compared to OACs. There 
was no significant interaction. 
 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
Recognition Times. Again, like in Experiment 1, we were interested in looking to see if the 
moderate AD group automatically created probable CLs (based on their latencies). We 
followed the same methodology as Experiment 1, by first comparing OACs and mild AD 
group reaction times. RTs that fell below 2 SDs were removed from the analysis. 
We ran a 2 (Group: OAC vs. Mild AD) x 4 (Item type: CLs vs. List Items vs. Unrelated 
unpresented CLs vs. foils) mixed-model ANOVA (see Table 9).  There was a main effect of 
item type [F(3, 57) = 1095.5 p < .001, η²p = .95]. Tukey’s post-hoc tests indicated longer RTs 
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for CLs (6458 ms), followed by list items (5008 ms) [p <.001], foils (3715 ms) and unrelated 
CLs (3677 ms) (there were no reliable difference between the latter two). As expected, there 
was a main effect of group F(1, 58) = 617.8, p < .001, η²p = .91. Tukey’s post-hoc tests 
showed the mild AD group were reliably slower (5264.5 ms) compared to the OACs (4165 
ms). There was no interaction p > .05. Like in Experiment 1 we ran separate analyses 
comparing CLs vs correct rejections [ F(1, 58) = 647.17 p < .001, η²p = .92] and found that 
false recognition of critical lures was reliably slower (6458 ms) compared to correct 
rejections of CLs (5046 ms). We also compared correct recognition of list items to those 
items that were not correctly recognized [F(1, 58) = 609, p < .001, η²p = .91] and found 
correctly recognized list items were reliably slower (5008 ms) than those list items that were 
not correct recognized (3703 ms). There was no difference in reaction time for correctly 
rejected foils compared to foils not rejected (p > .05) and no difference in reaction time 
between correctly rejected unrelated CLs versus nonrejected unrelated CLs. Next, just like in 
Experiment 1, we compared these latency pattern to those from the moderate AD group. 
 Again, data points with RTs that fell above or below 2 SDs for each participant were 
omitted from the analysis. There was a significant main effect of item type, F(3, 86) = 
1129.62, p < .001, η²p = .93. Tukey’s post-hoc tests showed longer RTs for CLs (M = 6973 
ms, p = < .01) compared to list items (M = 5465 ms, p = < .01), foils (M = 3856 ms), and 
unrelated CLs (M = 3839 ms). There were no reliable differences between the latter two.  
There was also a main effect of group, F(2, 87) = 507, p < .001, η²p = .9. Tukey’s post-hoc 
tests revealed that the Moderate AD group took reliably longer on the recognition task (M = 
5671 ms, p < .01) compared to the Mild AD group (M = 5264 ms, p < .01), and the OACs (M 
= 4165 ms, p < .01). There was no interaction (p ns).    
Like in Experiment 1, these data show that all three groups spent longer on the critical 
lure words than the other item types. Again, this pattern was the same for the Moderate AD 
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group (see Table 9).  This is a critical finding inasmuch as it may indicate that although adults 
with moderate AD responded “new” to all items, there may have been some residual memory 
activation for presented items and CLs that caused the delay in rejecting these items as new, 
with false memories having higher residual activation rates than list items (as predicted by 
associative-activation models). 
 
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
Analogical Reasoning Task 
The mean analogy solution rates (proportions) and the mean analogy solution times 
(in seconds) were calculated for each participant and analyzed separately in a series of 
3(Group: OAC vs. Mild AD vs. Moderate AD) x 5(Priming: primed/FM vs. primed/no-FM 
vs. primed/TM vs. primed/no-TM vs. unprimed) ANOVAs. Like in Experiment 1, problem 
solving data were conditionalized on memory performance and we used the same reaction 
time proxy measure for the moderate AD group. Again, primed/FM refers to analogy 
problems that were solved correctly only when the related false memory was recognized on 
the memory test and primed/no-FM refers to problems solved when the DRM list was 
presented but the participant did not falsely remember the critical lure on the recognition test.  
Primed/TM refers to analogy problems that were solved correctly only when the true memory 
was recognized on the memory test and primed/no-TM refers to problems solved when the 
DRM list was presented but the participant did not remember the actually presented critical 
lure on the recognition test.  Of course, unprimed refers to analogy problems that were solved 
correctly when no DRM priming list was presented.  The average percentage of primed items 
where the critical lure was falsely (primed/FM) or correctly (primed/TM) recognized and was 
not falsely (primed/no-FM) or correctly (primed/no-TM) recognized are shown in Table 10. 
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Analogy Solution Times. There were significant differences in solution times as a function 
of group and priming. Specifically there was a main effect for priming, F(4, 87) = 105.45, p < 
.001, η²p = .551, where Tukey’s post-hoc tests showed that solution times were faster for 
primed/FM problems (M = 4.33 s) than for primed/no-FM problems (M = 6.54 s,  p < .01), 
primed/TM problems (M = 6.59 s,  p < .01), primed/no-TM problems (M = 6.69 s,  p < .01), 
and unprimed problems (M = 6.68 s, p = < .01), and the latter four conditions did not differ. 
There was also a main effect of group, F(2, 87) =  555.67, p < .001, η²p = .925, where 
Tukey’s post-hoc tests showed OAC’s solution times were faster (M = 4.28 s) compared to 
people with Mild AD (M = 6.09 s) and Moderate AD (M = 8.13 s), with the latter two groups 
also differing significantly. There was no interaction (p ns; see Table 11). 
 
INSERT TABLES 10 AND 11 ABOUT HERE 
 
Analogy Solution Rates. Concerning solution rates, there was a main effect for priming, F(4, 
87) = 75.83, p < .001, η²p = .466, where Tukey’s post-hoc tests showed that solution rates 
were higher for primed/FM analogical problems (M = 2.22) than for primed/no-FM (M = 
0.57, p < .01), primed/TM (M = 1.56, p < .01), primed/no-TM (M = 1.06, p < .01), and when 
participants were unprimed (M = 1.52, p < .01), with the latter 3 conditions not differing. As 
expected, there was also a main effect of group, F(2, 87) = 533.84, p < .001, η²p = .925, 
where Tukey’s post-hoc tests showed the OACs solved reliably more problems compared to 
people with Mild AD and Moderate AD, with the latter two groups also differing reliably (see 
Table 11). There was no significant interaction. 
 These results, like those from Experiment 1, clearly indicate that despite the fact that 
people with moderate AD fail to consciously discriminate old from new items on recognition 
tests (again, saying “new” to everything), the time they take to say “new” differs as a function 
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of item type. In fact, like OACs and people with mild AD, people with moderate AD take 
longer to respond to CL probes than items that were actually presented. These CLs also 
served as effective primes regardless of group when it came time to solve subsequently 
presented analogical-reasoning problems. Moreover, like the OACs and the mild AD 
participants, problem-solving for people with moderate AD was facilitated only by CLs that 
were self-generated (i.e., false memories) and not by CLs that had actually been presented 
(i.e., true memories). Therefore, it seems clear that even for those people whose AD has 
progressed to a moderate level, associative activation within memory networks occurs 
automatically and the resultant activation can be used to prime analogical problem solutions. 
 
General Discussion 
 The present study set out to extend the positive consequences of false memories using 
CRAT problems (Experiment 1) and analogical-reasoning tasks (Experiment 2). Although we 
showed the positive consequences of false memories in people with mild AD and OACs in 
Akhtar et al. (in press) and Akhtar and Howe (2019), here we not only replicated these 
findings but also extended them to people with moderate Alzheimer’s Disease. Across both 
experiments using two different types of problem-solving tasks, we found that all three 
groups’ performance on these tasks was facilitated by self-generated false memories that 
arose from the prior presentation of DRM lists. That is, performance on CRATs (Experiment 
1) and analogical-reasoning tasks (Experiment 2) was better (greater accuracy and speed) 
when those problems were preceded by DRM lists whose CLs also served as the solution to 
those problems.  
 Our experiments show that like people with mild AD, those classified as having 
moderate AD also create false memories upon presentation of DRM lists. That is, although 
we found that in both experiments the moderate AD group responded “new” to all items, the 
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pattern of response times was similar across the different item types for all participants 
regardless of group. Specifically, although participants with moderate AD took longer to 
respond overall than those with mild AD who, in turn, took longer overall to respond than 
healthy older adult controls, like the latter two groups, those with moderate AD took longer 
to reject CLs than actual list items.  
 This finding is important because it demonstrates that there are other, long-term 
priming techniques that can be used to demonstrate the preservation of implicit memory in 
people experiencing moderate AD.  Equally important, these priming effects are conceptual 
in nature.  That is, they are based on the creation of false memories that arise from the 
activation of semantically-related information contained in associative networks.  Thus, 
consistent with the literature concerning the decline of explicit memory, but the sparing of 
implicit memory, in people with AD (e.g., see Fleishman et al., 2005; Meiran & Jelicic, 
1995), our results show that associative memory networks are still intact in people with 
moderate AD and that spreading activation mechanisms are still operating within these 
networks.   
Importantly, we also found that OACs and the mild AD group took reliably longer to 
falsely recognize CLs compared to the time it took them to correctly reject CLs. In addition, 
both groups were reliably slower to correctly respond “old” to list items compared to those 
that were rejected as “new.” When analyzing the latencies for the moderate AD group, we 
again found that their response times followed the same pattern as the older adults and the 
mild AD group. That is, although they did not explicitly recognize false memories on the 
recognition test, their response latencies to reject items suggested that some type of implicit 
monitoring for these items was taking place. We concluded from this that the moderate AD 
group had created probable false memories. Critically, like the OACs and the mild AD 
group, these probable false memories created by those with moderate AD facilitated 
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subsequent problem-solving performance, further vindicating the use of recognition response 
times to diagnose the contents of memory. Together, these data show that although people 
with moderate AD were unable to consciously or explicitly acknowledge the presence of 
(true and) false memories, using response times, we could see that such memories had been 
generated during DRM list presentation.  
Importantly, like previous research with children and adults (e.g., Howe et al., 2015), 
priming only occurred when CLs were self-generated and not when they were actually 
presented as part of the studied list (Experiment 2). As mentioned earlier, false memories are 
not simply false positive errors on a memory test. Rather, they are the result of the activation 
of one’s own semantic-associative memory networks and in that sense, they are a self-
generated memory response. Based on our results, it would appear that even individuals with 
moderate AD have intact memory networks whose activation can result in self-generated 
false memories, memories that can serve as better primes for subsequent problem-solving 
than other-generated information that was actually presented during study (“true” memories). 
Thus, the data reported here demonstrates that self-generated information from semantic 
networks is important for memory not just in children (e.g., Cunningham et al., 2014; Ford & 
Lobao, 2018), young adults (e.g., Mulligan & Lozito, 2004), old adults (e.g., Gutchess & 
Kensinger, 2018), and old adults with mild AD (Klein et al., 2003; Rosa et al., 2015), but 
now also extends to older adults with moderate AD.  
To summarize, our findings support and extend current research efforts to understand 
what aspects of memory remain intact in people with mild to moderate AD. Specifically, our 
results extend previous research on false memory formation in people with mild AD (e.g., 
Akhtar & Howe, 2019; Akhtar et al., in press; Evrard et al., 2016; Malone et al., 2019) to 
people experiencing moderate AD. Our findings also support the use of reaction time data 
when understanding the contents of memory, particularly in those populations whose 
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(recognition) memory responses do not necessarily reflect what is actually in their memory. 
This is especially true when some contents of memory, in particular the creation of false 
memories, are derived automatically through semantic-associative activation.  
Our findings also illustrate the importance of self-generated information in memory. 
Indeed, Experiment 2 showed that self-generated (false) memories facilitated subsequent 
problem-solving but those same memories when actually presented during study to 
participants had no effect on subsequent problem-solving. This is consistent with previous 
research with children and young adults (e.g., Howe et al., 2015) as well as work concerning 
the importance of self-referencing effects in false memory formation in people with mild AD 
(e.g., Rosa et al., 2015). Our data extend these findings to include people whose AD has 
progressed from mild to moderate levels. Importantly, then, even people with moderate AD 
automatically form self-generated (false) memories and those memories are more likely to 
prime solutions to subsequently presented problems than those memories that are based on 
information that was actually studied. 
Finally, our findings are consistent with and extend previous research on semantic 
priming effects in people with AD. As Gilet et al. (2017) discovered, although people with 
AD produced fewer CLs on a memory test than OACs, they, like the healthy controls, 
exhibited shorter lexical decision latencies for items that were preceded by a DRM list whose 
CL was related to the lexical decision item. Thus, like our findings, even though some 
participants were not explicitly aware of the contents of their memory, automatically formed 
false memories could be used to facilitate performance on a subsequent task. Our experiments 
extend these findings in two ways. First, we demonstrated that priming effects occur not just 
in lexical decision tasks but also when solving more complex CRAT and analogical-
reasoning problems. Second, these priming effects are not only present in people with mild 
AD but also in those diagnosed with moderate levels of AD. Importantly, although not 
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explicitly recognized as being in memory, by using analyses of response times to items on a 
recognition test, we could discover that false memories had been formed and that those 
memories could prime subsequent problem-solving solutions. Perhaps by using a more 
sensitive, implicit measure of memory (response times), we can discover the contents of 
memory in people who cannot explicitly acknowledge those contents on a memory test. 
Moreover, by providing a subsequent (e.g., problem-solving) task where performance 
advantages can arise only if specific items are in memory, we provide a second, independent 
measure of the contents of memory. Thus, when these measures are in place, it seems that 
even people with moderate AD can and do form false memories and those self-generated 
memories can prime and facilitate performance on subsequent problem-solving tasks. 
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Mild AD OAC P Value 
Age 73.54 (7.2) 74.55 (7.1) 71.24 (7.8) NS 
Education (years) 10.9 11.8 12.1 NS 
NART estimated IQ 115.32 (8.7) 116.28 (6.9) 114.4 (7.8) NS 
MMSE (out of 30) 18.9 (2.8) 25.8 (2.2) 29.8 (0.5) <0.0001*§+ 
      Range (defines minimal and mild) 17-20 24-27 29-30  
CERAD     
Immediate (max = 30) 2.6 (2.44) 13.1 (2.36) 17.8 (3.96) <0.0001*§+ 
Delayed (out of 10) 0 1.9 (1.97) 6.8 (3.58) <0.0001* 
Recognition (out of 10) 0 5.9 (3.1) 9.4 (3.4) <0.0001* 
Digit span (out of 10)     
FWD 2.9 (4.3) 5.3 (1.2) 6.9 (1.87) <0.0001*§+ 
BCK 0 2.99 (2.1) 5.6 (1.54) <0.0001* 
*Significant difference between OAC and Mild AD 
§ Significant difference between OAC and Moderate AD 
+ Significant difference between Mild AD and Moderate AD 
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Table 2. Percentage of correct items recognized in the recognition task for OACs and people 
with Mild AD. 
 Critical Lures List Items Foils Unrelated CL 
OAC 63.01% (1.23) 85.26% (3.2) 70.09% (4.59) 66.23% (3.99) 
Early AD 64.93% (6.31) 74.4% (1.97) 50.9% (2.9) 49.57% (2.11) 
Moderate AD* 62.4% (3.23) 49.26% (2.9) - - 






Table 3. Means and Standard deviations of Signal Detection Measures of Discriminability 
(d’) and Bias (C) for Studied Items and Critical Lures (CL). 
 OACs  Mild AD  
 d' C d' C 
Studied 0.83 (0.46) 0.89 (0.41) 0.35 (0.6) 0.51 (0.22) 
Lures 0.79 (0.54) 0.27 (0.26) 1.02 (0.11) 0.16 (21.4) 
PRIMING PROBLEM SOLUTIONS WITH FALSE MEMORIES!
!
40!
Table 4. Reaction time for the recognition task for OACs, Mild AD, and Moderate AD group. 
 Critical Lures Correct rejections CLs Test statistic 
t 




Foils Unrelated CL 
Moderate 
AD 
8326 (438) 6593 (353) 17.2** 6898 (666) 4969 (592 11.94** 4617 (578) 4636 (604) 
Mild AD 7106 (409) 5672 (287) 17.7** 5881 (806) 4273 (637) 12.85** 4283 (736) 4441 (827) 
OAC 5640 (619) 4626 (504) 9.8** 4716 (563) 3160 (421) 14.5** 3191 (607) 3310 (1041) 
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Table 5. Percentage of CRATs that were primed by false memories where the critical lure 
was recognized and where it was not recognized on the prior memory test. 
 
 Primed/FM Primed/No-FM 
OACs 63.01 36.99 
Mild AD 64.93 35.07 
Moderate AD* 62.14 37.86 
 

















Table 6. Mean CRAT problem solution times and solution rates for older adults, people 
with Mild AD, and people with Moderate AD as a function of priming. 
Participant                                                               Priming 
 Unprimed Priming/FM Priming/NO-FM 
Solution times (seconds) 
Older Adults 30.53 (4.54) 20.4 (4.3) 30.57 (4.44) 
Mild AD 37.46 (4.37) 26.57 (6.4) 36.54 (3.24) 
Moderate AD 43.48 (9.01) 35.79 (5.3) 45.39 (5.28) 
    
Solution rates (proportion) 
Older Adults  0.42 (0.94) 0.67 (0.86) 0.45 (0.19) 
Mild AD  0.31 (1.02) 0.56 (0.68) 0.31 (0.91) 
Moderate AD 0.20 (0.68) 0.40 (0.74) 0.21 (0.961) 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. FM = False Memory 
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Table 7. Percentage of correct items recognized in the recognition task for OACs and Mild 
AD group. 
 Critical Lures List Items Foils Unrelated CL 
OAC 60.01% (1.89) 82.26% (1.89) 70.69% (6.3) 64.89% (5.69) 
Mild AD 61.93% (2.97) 72.19% (2.27) 51% (3.28) 44.39% (6.45) 
Moderate AD* 62.18% (2.4) 48.34% (2.57) - - 








Table 8. Means and Standard deviations of Signal Detection Measures of Discriminability 
(d’) and Bias (C) for Studied Items and Critical Lures (CL). 
 OACs  AD  
 d' C d' C 
Studied 0.81 (0.46) 0.89 (0.41) 0.35 (0.6) 0.51 (0.22) 
Lures 0.97 (0.54) 0.24 (0.23) 1.05 (0.11) 0.16 (21.4) 
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Table 9. Reaction time for the recognition task for OACs, Mild AD, and Moderate AD group. 
 
 Critical Lures Correct rejections CLs Test statistic 
t 




Foils Unrelated CL 
Moderate 
AD 8002(410) 6320 (403) 19.3** 6380 (499) 4266 (533) 16.92** 4139 (703) 4164 (535) 
Mild AD 7181(430) 5540 (336) 17.29** 5543 (321) 4229 (293) 18.92** 4191 (311) 4141 (276) 
OAC 5735 (281) 4552 (274) 20.57** 4473 (269) 3178 (316) 16.25** 3239 (304) 3212 (265) 




Table 10. Percentage of analogies that were primed by true and false memories where the  
critical lure was recognized and where it was not recognized on the prior memory test. 
  
 Primed/FM Primed/No-FM Primed/TM Primed/No-TM 
OACs 60.01 39.99 84.2 15.8 
Mild AD 61.93 38.07 73.56 26.44 
Moderate AD* 62.18 37.82 52.16 47.84 








Table 11. Mean analogical problem solution times and solution rates for older adults, people 
with Mild AD, and people with Moderate AD as a function of priming.  
 
Participant   Priming   
 Unprimed Primed/TM Primed/no-
TM 
Primed/FM Primed/no-FM 
      
Solution times (seconds)      
OAC 4.71 (1.15) 4.63 (0.67) 4.84 (1.27) 2.56 (0.71) 4.66 (0.12) 
Mild AD 6.59 (0.9) 6.48 (0.87) 6.4 (0.7) 4.5 (0.76) 6.48 (0.71) 
Moderate AD 8.74 (1.41) 8.66 (1.27) 8.83 (1.02) 5.93 (1.05) 8.48 (0.93) 
Solution rates (proportions)     
OAC 0.72 (0.69) 0.73 (0.71) 0.27 (0.71) 0.97 (.3) 0.03 (0.30) 
Mild AD 0.5 (0.75) 0.52 (0.73) 0.48 (0.72) 0.73 (.76) 0.25 (0.72) 
Moderate AD 0.3 (0.48) 0.31 (0.52) 0.31 (0.45) 0.52 (.72) 0.28 (0.46) 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. FM = False Memory, TM = True Memory 
 
  




Appendix A. DRM and CRAT lists for Experiment 1. 
DRM CRAT 
PEN - pencil, write, fountain, quill, felt, bic, scribble, cross, light, marker PEN - pal, tip, knife 
FOOT - walk, hand, toe, kick, sandals, yard, ankle, boot, inch, sock FOOT - hold, print, stool 
COLD - hot, snow, warm, winter, ice, chilly, heat, weather, freeze, frost COLD - cut, sore, war 
FRUIT - apple, vegetable, orange, citrus, ripe, banana, berry, cherry, basket, 
cocktail 
FRUIT- bowl, Juice, Salad 
CUP - mug, saucer, coaster, lid, handle, coffee, soup, drink, plastic, sip CUP - measuring, cake, tea 
WISH - want, dream, desire, Hope, well, think, star, ring, wash, true WISH - list, death, bone 
ARMY - navy, soldier, rifle, draft, military, marines, infantry, war, pilot, 
combat 
ARMY - base, tank, 
territorial 
LONG - short, narrow, John, time, far, hair, road, thin, line, low LONG - bow, haul, jump 
SHIRT- blouse, sleeves, Trousers, tie, button, shorts, collar pocket, jersey, cuffs SHIRT - polo, flannel, vest 
MOUNTAIN - hill, valley, climb, summit, molehill, peak, plain, climber, steep, 
ski 

















Appendix B. Analogies and DRM lists for Experiment 2. 
Water:Boat::Road:Car 
Car – truck, bus, train, vehicle, drive, jeep, ford, race, keys, garage, highway, van 
Stand:Floor::Sit:Chair 
Chair – table, legs, seat, couch, desk, recliner, sofa, wood, cushion, swivel, stool, sitting 
Tooth:Brush::Hair:Wash 
Wash – rinse, dishes, mouth, scrub, laundry, soap, shampoo, dish, soak, cloth, bathroom 
Desert:Hot::Arctic:Cold 
Cold – snow, warm, winter, ice, wet, frigid, chilly, heat, weather, freeze, air, shiver 
Poverty:Wealth::Sickness:Health 
Health – sickness, good, happiness, ill, service, strong, disease, body, poorly, pain, vigor, 
robust 
Tunnel:Mountain::Bridge:River 
River – water, stream, lake, Mississippi, boat, tide, swim, flow, run, barrage, creek, brook 
Fire:Hot::Candy:Sweet 
Sweet – sour, sugar, bitter, good, taste, tooth, nice, honey, soda, chocolate, heart, cake 
Dark:Light::Short:Long 
Long – tall, narrow, John, time, far, hair, island, road, thin, underwear, distance, line 
Pestle:Mortar::Saucer:Cup 
Cup – mug, tea, measuring, coaster, lid, handle, coffee, straw, goblet, soup, stein, drink 
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